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Living with Leave Part II:  Notice, Designation, and Substitution of Leave Issues 
 
Note:  We have developed our understanding of the assertions and concerns of various family and business groups from our reading of FMLA cases, from 
materials developed by the groups, and through individual conversations with group representatives.  Where comments have appeared in writing, we have 
included at least one source for each concern or assertion, even if we have heard similar information from additional sources.  For purposes of this chart, the term 
“family and labor groups” includes:  AFL-CIO, D.C. Employment Justice Center, Labor Project for Working Families, National Partnership for Women and 
Families, and the National Women’s Law Center.  For purposes of this chart, the term “business groups” includes: HR Policy Association (formerly LPA), 
National Association of Manufacturers, Society for Human Resource Management, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Issue Family and labor 
groups’ assertions and 
concerns 
(as we understand them) 
Business groups’ 
assertions and concerns 
(as we understand them) 
WF 2010 Comments 
 
An employer is required to 
post a written notice regarding 
an employee’s FMLA rights. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 2619(a) 
29 C.F.R. § 825.300   
 
An employer is also required 
to provide written notice 
regarding the employees’ 
FMLA rights and obligations 
in its employee handbook; 
provide general written 
guidance regarding 
employees’ FMLA rights and 
obligations if no such 
handbook or manual exists; 
and provide an individualized 
notice to an employee of his or 
her rights and responsibilities 
under the law when the 
employee requests leave. 
 
These requirements ensure that 
workers have the timely 
information they need to make 
informed judgments about 
when, whether, and how to 
assert their rights under the 
FMLA.   
 
The only notice the statute 
requires of employers is that they 
post a notice about employees’ 
FMLA rights. 
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Issue Family and labor 
groups’ assertions and 
concerns 
(as we understand them) 
Business groups’ 
assertions and concerns 
(as we understand them) 
WF 2010 Comments 
 
29 C.F.R. § 825.301 
 
See Sanders v. May Dept. 
Stores Co., 315 F.3d 940 (8th 
Cir. 2003); Conoshenti v. 
Public Service Electric and 
Gas Company, 364 F.3d 135 
(3rd Cir. 2004). 
 
 
An employee is required to 
provide 30 days notice (or, 
when the request is less than 
30 days, “as practicable”) 
when the need for leave is 
foreseeable.  
 
29 U.S.C. § 2612(e) 
29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a) 
 
The employee need not 
mention the FMLA explicitly 
when requesting leave.  The 
employee must provide “at 
least verbal notice sufficient to 
make the employer aware that 
the employee needs FMLA-
qualifying leave.” 
 
29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) 
 
 
These notice requirements 
sufficiently protect employers  
and give them a way to handle 
their workforce issues. 
 
Many workers are not familiar 
with or are confused about the 
FMLA’s protections.  (DOL 
2000 study)  It therefore makes 
sense that employees not be 
required to specifically request 
FMLA leave or be required to 
prove that their condition meets 
the regulatory test for a serious 
health condition.  
 
Employees are required only to 
provide oral notice, not written 
notice.  An employee is not 
required to specifically mention 
the FMLA; the employee need 
only state that time off is needed 
and provide a general reason that 
might plausibly meet the FMLA 
standard.  The obligation then 
shifts to the employer (often a 
low level supervisor) to get the 
necessary information to 
determine whether the leave 
qualifies under the FMLA.  This 
requires employers to pry 
unnecessarily into an employee’s 
private matters.  (LPA) 
 
“If a supervisor does not ask the 
necessary probing questions and 
improperly fails to classify the 
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groups’ assertions and 
concerns 
(as we understand them) 
Business groups’ 
assertions and concerns 
(as we understand them) 
WF 2010 Comments 
See Brennerman v. 
MedCentral Health System, 
366 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Spangler v. Federal Home 
Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 
F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2002); 
Satterfield v. Wal-mart Stores, 
Inc., 135 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 
1998); Manuel v. Westlake 
Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758 
(5th Cir. 1995). 
 
leave as covered by the FMLA, 
he or she could be personally 
liable for the FMLA violation.” 
(LPA) 
 
An employer may require that 
the employee submit a health 
care provider’s certification of 
the employee’s or family 
member’s serious health 
condition. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 2613 
 
29 C.F.R. § 825.305, 306, 307 
 
See Perry v. Jaguar of Troy, 
353 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Miller v. AT&T, 250 F.3d 820 
(4th Cir. 2001); Henderson v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 17 F. 
Supp.2d 1238 (N.D. Okla. 
1998).  
 
 
It is sometimes difficult for 
employees to get doctors’ 
appointments and/or get doctors 
to complete and submit 
paperwork in a timely fashion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The regulations include an overly 
expansive regulatory definition of 
health care provider. 
 
An employer is prohibited from 
contacting the health care 
provider without the employee’s 
permission, even in order to 
clarify or authenticate the 
doctor’s certification.  Even with 
the employee’s permission, an 
employer may not directly contact 
the employee’s health care 
provider.  Rather, a health care 
provider hired by the employer 
must contact the employee’s 
health care provider to get the 
information.  This is very 
difficult, costly and time-
 
Regulations suggest that employers may delay or deny 
FMLA leave if employee fails to provide timely 
certification.  Courts, however, generally have given 
employees leeway in correcting untimely or 
inadequate certifications. 
 
The only time there appears to be an express 
prohibition on contacting health care providers is after 
the employee already has submitted a completed 
medical certification. (See 29 C.F.R. § 825.307) 
 
29 C.F.R. § 825.208 contemplates that a doctor will 
talk directly to a supervisor and 29 C.F.R. § 
825.302(c) has no express prohibition on a supervisor 
calling a doctor with the employee’s consent. 
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Issue Family and labor 
groups’ assertions and 
concerns 
(as we understand them) 
Business groups’ 
assertions and concerns 
(as we understand them) 
WF 2010 Comments 
consuming for employers to 
obtain clarification or 
authentication of certifications.  
(Chamber) 
 
 
The employer has the right to 
require an employee to get 
second and third opinions.  
These opinions must be paid 
for by the employer. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 2613(c), (d) 
29 C.F.R. § 825.307 
 
See Stekloff v. St. John’s 
Mercy Health Systems, 218 
F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2000); but 
see, Miller v. AT&T, 60 F. 
Supp. 2d 574 (S.D. W.Va. 
1999); Sims v. Alameda-
Contra Costa Transit District, 
2 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D. Ca. 
1998). 
 
 
Regulation is insufficient – 
allows the employer to deny 
leave without seeking a second 
or third opinion. Employers 
who fail to exhaust the option 
to seek second and third 
opinions should be precluded 
from challenging an 
employee’s serious health 
condition in subsequent 
litigation. (AFL-CIO) 
 
Getting second and third opinions 
at the employer’s expense is 
costly for employers. 
 
 
 
 
For pregnancy or chronic 
conditions, employer may 
request recertification no more 
often than every 30 days 
unless the circumstances 
described in the previous 
 
These recertification rules are 
reasonable and appropriate.   
An employer should not be 
permitted to harass employees 
for recertifications.  Moreover, 
the employee bears the cost of 
 
These recertification rules do not 
allow employers sufficient 
management control.   Once an 
employee gets a “note from the 
doctor” stating the need for 
intermittent leave because of 
 
Employer may request recertification in less than 30 
days if “the employer receives information that casts 
doubt upon the continuing validity of the 
certification” (per 29 C.F.R. § 825.308). 
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Issue Family and labor 
groups’ assertions and 
concerns 
(as we understand them) 
Business groups’ 
assertions and concerns 
(as we understand them) 
WF 2010 Comments 
certification have changed 
dramatically or the employer 
receives information that casts 
doubt on the employee’s stated 
reason for absence.  
 
Certifications for intermittent 
or reduced schedule leave 
should include the minimum 
period necessary for such 
leave.  Employers may not 
require recertification in less 
than this minimum period, 
unless one of the 
circumstances noted above 
applies.   
 
Recertifications are at the 
employee’s expense.  
Employers may not require 
second and third opinions at 
the recertification stage. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 2613(e) 
 
29 C.F.R. § 825.308 
 
 
 
 
the recertification. 
 
 
some medical condition, that 
employee can continue to use that 
certification.  An employer may 
not require the employee to 
provide a certification for each 
absence.  
 
The fact that an employer may 
not request a second or third 
opinion on recertification is very 
problematic.  It means that 
employers have no real recourse 
for challenging the validity of 
recertification even when the 
employer suspects abuse. (NAM) 
 
An employer is required to 
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Issue Family and labor 
groups’ assertions and 
concerns 
(as we understand them) 
Business groups’ 
assertions and concerns 
(as we understand them) 
WF 2010 Comments 
advise an employee who 
requests FMLA leave whether 
s/he is eligible (e.g., meets the 
1250 hours and one year 
threshold). 
 
29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) 
 
See Babcock v. Bellsouth 
Advertising and Publishing 
Corp., 348 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 
2003); Duty v. Norton-Alcoa 
Proppants, 293 F.3d 481 (8th 
Cir. 2002); Kosakow v. New 
Rochelle Radiology 
Associates, P.C., 274 F.3d 706 
(2nd Cir. 2001); Gurley v. 
Ameriwood Indus., 232 F. 
Supp. 2d 969 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An employer is required to 
designate leave as FMLA 
leave.  An employer is also 
required to notify the 
employee if paid leave will be 
substituted for the FMLA 
leave (and designated as 
FMLA leave).  As a general 
matter, this designation and 
 
 
Putting this burden on the 
employer is appropriate.  This 
protects employees who are 
unsure about whether their 
leave is FMLA qualifying (i.e., 
whether, if they choose to take 
leave, it will be job-protected). 
It also gives the employees the 
information they need to decide 
 
 
The burden on the employer is 
unrealistic.  Once a request for 
leave has been made, an employer 
has only two days to determine 
whether the leave is FMLA 
qualifying and then to notify the 
employee.  This is difficult to 
administer, particularly when HR 
departments are in different 
 
 
Query: How do the designation and certification 
requirements work together in practice?  If employer 
has to designate leave as FMLA leave within 2 days, 
but employer also has the right to seek certification of 
the request, does the preliminary designation process 
set forth in the regulations (29 C.F.R. § 825.208(e)(2)) 
work well for employers? 
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Issue Family and labor 
groups’ assertions and 
concerns 
(as we understand them) 
Business groups’ 
assertions and concerns 
(as we understand them) 
WF 2010 Comments 
notice must occur within two 
days of the leave being 
requested. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 825.208 
 
See Conoshenti v. Public 
Service Elec. & Gas Co., 364 
F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004); 
Katekovich v. Team Rent a 
Car of Pittsburgh, 
2002 WL 1288766 (3rd Cir. 
2002); Hicks v. Leroy’s 
Jewelers, Inc., 225 F.3d 659 
(6th Cir. 2000); Phillips v. 
Leroy-Somer North America, 
et al., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5334 (W.D. Tenn.  2003); 
Blankenship v. Buchanan 
General Hospital, Inc., 999 F. 
Supp. 832 (W.D.Va 1998). 
 
how to use their leave. 
 
Allowing employers to require 
substitution of paid leave (to 
run concurrently with the 
FMLA leave) benefits 
employers.  It ensures that an 
employee’s overall leave will 
not exceed 12 weeks. (National 
Partnership) 
 
 
 
locations than the employee’s 
worksite. 
 
Employers are not sure who is 
really entitled to FMLA leave; it 
is difficult to make a quick 
determination. (See discussion in 
Chart I re definition of serious 
health condition; see also 
discussion above re the fact that 
employees need not expressly 
request FMLA leave.) 
 
Apparently the change/fix in the 
Gregg bill (re substitution of paid 
leave) is not something all 
business groups are asking for:  
“Employers generally support the 
existing provisions of the FMLA 
that authorize them to run FMLA 
leave concurrently with existing 
employer-provided paid leave 
benefits.   While there was some 
discussion that the provisions of 
[the Gregg bill] addressing paid 
leave substitution might help with 
those employees trying to game 
the system, most LPA  members 
did not see this provision as 
offering substantial help or 
clarification to them.” (LPA) 
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groups’ assertions and 
concerns 
(as we understand them) 
Business groups’ 
assertions and concerns 
(as we understand them) 
WF 2010 Comments 
 
Impact of Ragsdale v. 
Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 
535 U.S. 81 (2002). 
 
 
 
Ragsdale struck down 29 
C.F.R. § 825.700(a) because 
the penalty was not tailored to 
the harm suffered by the 
particular employee.  The 
holding in that case is strictly 
limited to 29 C.F.R. § 
825.700(a) and to the facts of 
that case.   
 
Thus, the general regulatory 
designation and notice 
requirements are still valid.  
DOL has the authority to issue 
an enforcement provision that 
would make it possible for an 
employee to prove that a failure 
to designate and/or notify 
constitutes “actual harm.” 
(National Partnership) 
 
DOL’s notice provisions are no 
longer valid. (NAM) 
 
 
The lower courts appear to be applying Ragsdale to 
invalidate the penalty provisions of the notice or 
designation requirements (i.e., leave taken is not 
counted as FMLA leave) only when individual harm 
cannot be proven. 
   
Long term impact of Ragsdale is unknown.   
 
Could be interpreted by the lower courts to mean: 
 
Only the penalty provision at issue in Ragsdale (29 
C.F.R. §825.700(a)) is invalid, but it is invalid  only 
when individual harm can’t be shown;  
-OR- 
Only the penalty provision at issue in Ragsdale (29 
C.F.R. §825.700(a)) is invalid, but it is invalid in all 
cases; 
-OR- 
All penalties imposed by the regulations that create a 
substantive right to leave beyond that found in the 
statute are invalid. 
 
In addition, as noted above, some business groups 
also believe all of the notice requirements in the 
regulations exceed DOL’s authority under the statute. 
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